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Abstract. Technology is shaping our lives in a multitude of ways. This
is fuelled by a technology infrastructure, both legacy and state of the art,
composed of a heterogeneous group of hardware, software, services and
organisations. Such infrastructure faces a diverse range of challenges to
its operations that include security, privacy, resilience, and quality of ser-
vices. Among these, cybersecurity and privacy are taking the centre-stage,
especially since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came
into effect. Traditional security and privacy techniques are overstretched
and adversarial actors have evolved to design exploitation techniques
that circumvent protection. With the ever-increasing complexity of tech-
nology infrastructure, security and privacy-preservation specialists have
started to look for adaptable and flexible protection methods that can
evolve (potentially autonomously) as the adversarial actor changes its
techniques. For this, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML)
and Deep Learning (DL) were put forward as saviours. In this paper, we
look at the promises of AI, ML, and DL stated in academic and industrial
literature and evaluate how realistic they are. We also put forward poten-
tial challenges a DL based security and privacy protection technique has
to overcome. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion on what
steps the DL and the security and privacy-preservation community have
to take to ensure that DL is not just going to be hype, but an opportu-
nity to build a secure, reliable, and trusted technology infrastructure on
which we can rely on for so much in our lives.
Keywords: Security · Privacy · Machine Learning · Deep Learning ·
Application.
1 Introduction
Computing technology is becoming an integral part of our lives and has many
facets ranging from supercomputing (used in weather prediction, cutting-edge
research and business automation) to embedded devices (like smartphones, elec-
tronic devices in a home and intelligent transport systems). Among many, secu-
rity and privacy are considered to be two distinct and unique challenges. In the
security and privacy domain, any protection system has to match a constantly
evolving adversarial actor. According to the Symantec cybercrime report [1], the
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overall number of vulnerabilities has increased by 13% in 2018. Similarly, accord-
ing to Cybersecurity Ventures [2], zero-day exploits seen in the wild will grow
from one per week (in 2015) to one per day by 2021. It is practically impos-
sible for a human to keep pace with the sheer number of cybersecurity events
(and related activities) on a daily basis on top of an already daunting threat
landscape [3].
In this paper, and as a matter of fact in any context, security and privacy are
relative terms. It is not discussed as an absolute state, but rather as a state with
potential and/ or accepted risks. The global cost of data breaches has increased
by 6.4% [4] and has the potential to severely damage an organisation’s bottom-
line, and that is without taking the potential penalties imposed by the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) into account [5]. As per the GDPR, an
organisation can be fined up to e10 million or two percent of the firm’s global
turnover for a small offence (whichever is greater). For a serious offence, an
organisation can be fined up to e20 million or four percent of a firm’s global
turnover (whichever is greater) [5].
Furthermore, there is a crisis of skilled cybersecurity practitioners. According
to study [6], the cybersecurity job market will grow by approximately 6 million
USD globally by 2019 – with potential shortages of trained professionals up to
25%. Automation of decisions and actions based on network and system gener-
ated alerts has the potential to help overcome the challenges related to security
and privacy – both in a technological and a business-operations (e.g. labour
shortages) dimension.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is seen as a potential solution towards the cyber-
security automation challenge in some academic and industrial circles. Machine
Learning (ML) has been successfully deployed in a number of domains includ-
ing but not limited to: image classification [7], objective detection and recogni-
tion [8], language translation, and voice synthesis [9]. Deep Learning (DL), a type
of Machine Learning (ML) method, in most cases does not require prior expert
knowledge for its learning (an obvious exception is Neuro-Fuzzy techniques).
Therefore, it needs less manually engineered feature extraction and specialist
knowledge [10]. DL can detect patterns in the raw data with potentially higher
and more abstract level representations - a function that is very interesting for
cybersecurity zero-day vulnerability/ exploit detection. Similarly, DL is used to
abstract malware’s behavioural features and anomalous activity and can then
be used to detect its existence in a system [11, 12].
AI as a cybersecurity tool is expected to capture a large market and it is clear
that AI has the potential to impact the cybersecurity space [13]. Furthermore,
there is sufficient market interest in both commercial (financial incentives) and
academic research. It is understood that there is a potential to mislead an ML/
DL deployment as discussed in existing literature [14, 15], which is not the
focus of this paper. In this paper, we discuss the challenges of deploying AI-
based techniques (ML/ DL) to security domains. The discussion highlights the
difference between the theory and practice of applying DL methods as a general
security tool. The discussed challenges come from the technical development and
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exploration of DL methods in the context of cybersecurity – showcasing the fact
DL techniques in themselves are not the panacea but mearly a tool that requires
a number of correct (and in some cases trustworthy) features to be effective. The
robustness of DL is stated in [14] as inversely proportional to the potential of an
attacker’s ability to find adversarial examples, which can impact the accurate
classification and detection of a threat.
However, in this paper, we argue that robustness, no doubt an important fea-
ture, is not just dependent on the attacker’s ability to find adversarial examples.
It also depends on an interdependent relationship of input data, its accuracy and
trustworthiness, potential for adversarial examples, feature richness (needed for
accurate classification and detection), and the data representing all possible case
scenarios. We will discuss these features in further detail throughout this paper.
Furthermore, this paper examines the ML/ DL not only from theoretical and
feature/ability specific limitation but also from practical challenges related to
implementation and deployment. Existing papers either focus on how successful
ML/ DL were in their deployment or specification implementation challenges
they faced, but discussion on the challenges related to ML/ DL deployed as
security and privacy mechanism are not collectively discusses.
1.1 Structure of the Paper
Section 2 elaborates on the existing academic work that has shown the promise
of ML/ DL as an automation tool for security and privacy practices. In section
3, we dive into the technical discussion of DL and how automation based on
it is designed and developed. The discussion is derived from first impressions,
based on the authors’ practical experience coming from a security background.
Section 4 articulates the practical considerations that a security practitioner has
to take into account when working on DL deployment. Section 5 is a list of DL
features that would make the technology a useful security tool for cybersecurity
practitioners.
2 Security and Privacy by Deep Learning
In this section, we survey the types of security and privacy services and ap-
plications in which DL is deployed successfully – as represented by academic
literature.
2.1 Deep Learning for Security and Privacy
The set of security and privacy services that are being explored in academic
literature to be the target deployment scenarios for DL are:
1. Malware Detection: Efficient pattern recognition in large datasets is what
ML/ DL is purpose built for. A number of proposals are put forward in
academic literature to identify malware with high accuracy [16, 17]. In most
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of these proposals, pattern recognition is based on a particular behaviour
(communication, syscall and resource usage/ utilisation patterns, etc). For
an adversarial entity, the objective is to hide or exhibit its behaviour within
the scope of genuine applications to avoid detection.
2. Anomaly Detection or Network Intrusion Detection: Both the anomaly and
the network intrusion detection rely on network traffic analysis. Based on
this analysis, ML/ DL techniques try to find usage and communication pat-
terns that represent an abnormal behaviour. It is important to keep in mind
that anomalous behaviour is not necessarily a set of activities that are not al-
lowed by system policies (security/ privacy). It is just an out-of-the-ordinary
activity that can be genuine or malicious. For example, user A has access to
client records. Usually, user A only accesses one record a day, but today user
A accesses the entire list of clients. If the access control policy only focused
on access (may user A access client records?) and not on frequency (how
many client records user A can access?), accessing all client records would
be a permitted action and not suspicious. However, this action might be
anomalous. Such classification and detection of out-of-pattern usages nicely
fits within the current capabilities of ML/ DL technology [18]–[20].
3. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Detection: DDoS can be viewed as an
anomalous request to access a particular resource. Therefore, based on the
access patterns to a particular resource (a website or an application), ML/
DL can efficiently identify out-of-pattern access requests [21, 22].
From the above list, we can ascertain that DL is not widely used for privacy-
preservation techniques. There is a potential for exposing data on user access
patterns based on the user connection graph, especially in the context of data
flow analysis. These domains might have unique patterns that can be useful for
an effective DL deployment but an academic literature search for applications
of DL in these fields did not yield substantial results. Below, we explain some of
the identified privacy related services that might be suitable for DL deployment
but limited work has been carried out in academic literature:
1. Data Flow Analysis: The flow of data between any two entities can reveal
data consumption in an organisation. For example, the flow of data between
the consumer database and marketing teams can represent potential value
for consumer profiling, targeted marketing and campaign analysis. The data
flow and usage in a specific enterprise have a set pattern, even when looking
at individual features such as ‘data flow’ and the actual ‘contents of the
data’. Therefore, ML/ DL can be used to identify anomalous usage of data
based on the data flows. Anomalous data flow patterns are used by ML/ DL
deployed mostly for Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or Intrusion Detection
Prevention (IDP) but not as a privacy preservation function.
2. Data Exposure Potential: Whether in an enterprise environment or in per-
sonal settings, individuals have a circle of other individuals with whom they
communicate. A community map for each individual can be constructed
based on these communication patterns which can represent not only ‘with
Deep Learning Application in Security and Privacy 5
whom’ individuals share information but also ‘what information’ is being
shared with their community. For example, an individual shares one type
of information with only a subset of the individuals in his/ her community.
This is easily classifiable and based on the patterns, ML/ DL can predict
whether information accessible to an individual at a particular point in time
has a high probability of being shared with certain other individuals. This
analysis can be used to build a data exposure prediction which can be a use-
ful tool for privacy-preservation and assessment. Furthermore, in the event
of an information leakage, an analysis of the data flows and the probability of
data exposure can be incorporated into the forensic investigation to quickly
find any potential points (individuals) that could have leaked the informa-
tion. The potential of ML/ DL has not been explored in the context of data
exposure in current academic literature. We believe that the application of
ML/ DL for such analysis shows a lot of promise.
Most of the existing literature about privacy and DL is focuses on how to
design DL methods in a manner that does not violate the users’ privacy [23]–[25].
Another application of DL in privacy is to build recommendation systems for
users. For example, Yu et. al. [26] put forward a privacy setting recommendation
system (iPhoto) for photo sharing based on image analysis. Most dimensions
related to DL and privacy are beyond the scope of the this paper. The scope of
the paper is how DL itself can be used as a privacy-protection mechanism.
3 Deep Learning - A Deeper Look at its Application
In this section, we explore the technical aspects of understanding and deploying
DL. The discussion revolves around the pre-requisites for DL deployment, the
tools that can be used, and DL optimisation. Readers are referred to consult
the survey by Zubair et. al. [27] for an in-depth analysis of DL structures and
methodologies.
3.1 Representation Learning
DL uses representation learning algorithms to automatically identify complex
hidden structures in large datasets [10]. Relations between parameters can be
more or less hidden depending on the features present in the data. Representa-
tion learning works to solve this problem by transforming raw data into a more
useful representation for detection and classification predictors by highlighting
the important dependencies [28]. The challenge is to generalise as much as pos-
sible while also preserving most of the information in the original dataset.
DL implements the learning technique in the form of a model, a concatena-
tion of multiple, relatively simple layers that each perform a transformation on
the data [28]. The layers’ input is either raw data (input layer) or the previ-
ous layer’s learned representation of its input (hidden and output layers). This
leads to automatically identified, hierarchical levels of abstraction, also called
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feature extraction, with higher level features defined as a composition of lower-
level features [29, 30]. During the training phase, the model adjusts the internal
parameters used to transform the data to achieve a more useful result [10].
3.2 Data Normalisation
DL models rely heavily on data as it is the basis of the pre-training and training
phases, which in turn underlie the specialisation of a model to a task.
DL does not need a perfectly curated dataset due to its learning scheme.
Semi-supervised techniques have been shown to alleviate problems, however, a
new training strategy and a better cost function could make training on incom-
plete and noisy data sets more efficient [31]. Whitening data is a known way of
speeding up training convergence, readers are referred to [32] for details on how
to transform the input data.
Ioffe and Szegedy [33] describes batch normalisation, where normalisation
is embedded in the model architecture as another method to reduce training-
times. It works towards fixing the distribution of the layer’s inputs and thereby
solves the problems introduced by internal covariate shift. Internal covariate shift
describes the fact that the layers’ input distribution continuously changes during
training due to the internal parameters updating [33]. The difficulty in changing
the dataset in any way is to preserve as much of the original information as
possible. This can be achieved by normalising the training examples relative to
the entire training data [33]. Other, less efficient ways of combating covariate shift
include lowering the training rate and careful parameter initialisation. Using DL
in combination with Big Data is a popular concept in the industry, however, there
are many challenges that need to be overcome. The three V’s model identifies
them as volume, variety, and velocity.
Chen and Lin [31] provides the authors’ thoughts on how to solve these
problems. According to the authors, the large volume of Big Data (number of
inputs, number of represented classes and high dimensionality of the entries)
cannot be accommodated by a single machine due to its limited memory and
computing capacity. A distributed framework would be more suited to the task.
DL has been successfully utilised for the integration of heterogeneous data, e.g.
[34] and [35]. Therefore, the authors believe that DL methods can be applied to
Big Data’s large variety of data structures with further optimisation work. They
propose online learning to combat the velocity (how quickly data is generated).
There are many large data sets ranging across a wide selection of categories
publicly available which can be used in training and testing networks. Examples
are the MNIST database1 of handwritten digits and the Google Audioset2, which
includes thousands of labelled audio clips. Kaggle3 is a platform that hosts ML
competitions and maintains public datasets.
1 http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist
2 https://research.google.com/audioset
3 https://www.kaggle.com
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3.3 Designing Deep Learning Models
There are different neural network architectures used in DL, each with their own
advantages and disadvantages. Convolutional networks are a type of feedforward
network that are designed to process multidimensional signals such as images
and video [36], whereas recurrent networks are adapted to work with sequence
data which makes them more difficult to train but applicable to natural language
processing (NLP) challenges [37]. Deep Belief Networks (DBNs) are made up of
several layers of restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs) and are useful for when
the training data set is made up of both labelled and unlabelled entries. They
often perform better than networks trained only with backpropagation [36].
The training distribution and structure can be an important factor in the
choice of model and learning method. Supervised learning methods require la-
belled data and tend to have good results when large quantities of data are avail-
able [29]. They adjust the model’s internal parameters based on the training loss,
calculated by comparing the predicted output to the expected output as defined
by the data entry’s label. When it comes to unsupervised learning, the ultimate
goal is to abstract the raw data in a way that identifies the important factors of
variation that apply to all classes. [30] has had success applying a transductive
strategy by using linear models such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
among others, as some of the network’s layers. Semi-supervised learning makes
use of both labelled and unlabelled data. The RBMs that make up a DBN are
pre-trained with an unsupervised greedy layer-by-layer algorithm and the whole
model is then fine-tuned with labelled data and backpropagation. DBNs often
perform better than networks trained solely with backpropagation [36], as the
combination of non-linear layers in a model can be sensitive to the initialisation
values. Pre-training, as used with DBNs, can mitigate this sensitivity [29].
When it comes to optimising a model’s accuracy, tuning the hyperparameters
is an important step. They are values that directly influence the training of a
neural network by configuring a model’s complexity and the learning process [38],
both of which are critical to the model’s performance. However, finding the ideal
values for these parameters can be very difficult as fine-tuning is often based
on experience. According to [30], there are two common ways of optimising a
model’s performance through the choice of hyperparameters: manual trial and
error and a grid search. Both approaches run into problems when the number of
parameters is too large. Readers are referred to [30] and [39] for a more efficient
optimisation based on random search and greedy exploration. The number and
type of parameters differ between models and learning algorithms. Some of the
most common include the learning rate, momentum, number of hidden units,
number of epochs and batch size.
Training large, distributed networks is slow, as the use of parallel resources
is very inefficient. [40] introduces a way to reduce the number of free parameters
without dropping the accuracy, as many parameters can be predicted and are,
therefore, redundant.
Over- and underfitting describe situations where a neural network has not
learned the ideal generalisation of the training data which leads to poor per-
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formance when new data is introduced. This can also be described as the bias/
variance dilemma, a trade-off between high bias and high variance [41]. Com-
mon metrics such as training and test error are used to analyse the accuracy of
a model can help identify over- and underfitting.
High variance means that a model fails to differentiate between the signal
(the general, underlying pattern) and the noise (dataset-specific randomness) of
a dataset. In other words, an overfit model has failed to sufficiently generalise
the features of its specific training distribution and therefore performs poorly on
previously unseen data, as it has no general knowledge it can apply. Overfitting
can occur with a complex model whose learning algorithm has a low bias and a
high variance. Cross validation is a proven method of preventing overfitting by
stopping training before the specification becomes to high [42]. The point in time
at which to stop training is identified by comparing the model’s accuracy on the
training data to its accuracy on the unseen testing data. Training is stopped if
the difference starts growing or is deemed too large, also called early stopping.
Reducing the number of parameters is another method of combating overfitting
[42]. Dropout layers have also been shown to be successful because they prevent
the co-adaption of a network’s hidden units [29]. They introduce unpredictable
noise into the data by dropping random parameters in each training iteration.
Bias describes the difference between the model’s expected output and the
correct values. It occurs when the model is oversimplified and does not have
enough flexibility to capture the underlying relations of features present in the
data or when there are insufficient parameters. A model is said to be underfit
if it has a low variance but a high bias and can be identified by a high error
on both the training and the test data. A possible solution to this problem is
changing the model’s structure and parameters so that it better fits the problem
to be solved.
Bias and variance are inversely related. The ideal model minimises the ex-
pected total error of a learning algorithm, which is defined as the sum of squared
bias, variance and irreducible error. While bias and variance are reducible, the
irreducible error comes from modelling the problem itself.
3.4 Deploying Deep Learning Methods
There are many open-source tools and frameworks that support DL which can
vary greatly in overhead, running speed and number of pre-made components.
Following are short descriptions of a small selection of them.
TensorFlow4 is a Python-based library with automatic differentiation capa-
bilities that support ML and DL. The high-performance numerical computations,
modelled as data flow graphs, can be applied to other domains as well. Tensor-
Flow is used by companies such as Google, Uber, and AMD.
PyTorch5 is another such library which enables rapid research on ML net-
works. The focus lies on extensibility and low overhead, which is possible be-
cause the core logic is written in C++. It also supports reverse mode automatic
4 https://www.tensorflow.org
5 https://pytorch.org
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differentiation, which is the most important type of differentiation for DL appli-
cations [43] and distributed training. In 2017, Uber AI Labs released Pyro6, a
deep probabilistic programming language (PPL) based on PyTorch.
Caffe7 is a C++ library that provides interfaces for Python and MATLAB
[44]. It is a clean and modifiable framework, due to the fact that the model’s
representation is separate from the model’s implementation [45]. It is very fast
in training convolutional networks and allows for seamless switching between
devices (CPU and GPU).
MATLAB8 can be used for DL among other things and allows users to build
and analyse models, even with little expert knowledge in DL. It provides access
to models such as GoogLeNet and AlexNet and works with models from Caffe
and TensorFlow-Keras. MATLAB also supports collaboration with the PyTorch
and MXNet frameworks.
MXNet9 is a very versatile DL framework which supports imperative and
symbolic programming as well as multiple languages, such as C++, Python,
R, Scala, MATLAB and JavaScript. Its running speed is similar to Caffe and
significantly faster than TensorFlow and it is used by both AWS and Azure,
among others [44].
4 Practical Considerations of Deep Learning Deployment
In this section, we discuss the challenges related to deploying DL as part of the cy-
ber security and privacy-preservation mechanism. We discuss three major issues
related to the DL, which is in no way an exhaustive list. However, the problems
listed in this section have a significant impact on current DL implementations.
4.1 Training Data Set
Any DL technique requires training to achieve specialisation for a task, therefore
the training data set and its structure are very important. There are two crucial
elements about the training data set: a) feature-richness and b) trustworthiness.
Feature-richness means that the training data should be an extensive collection
so that the DL model can identify as many features as possible, which will
help it identify genuine and malicious behaviours accurately once it is deployed.
Features have to be as extensive as possible; for example, data related to an
activity should cover as much information about that activity as possible so
a malicious entity has as little room as possible to manoeuvre and trick the
deployed DL system. Furthermore, the training data should include a diverse
set of behaviours. If a training data set is representative of a behaviour set, the
algorithm has a better chance of accurately classifying features in it. However, if
the behaviour set is not comprehensive, any behaviour that is not part of the set
6 http://pyro.ai
7 http://caffe.berkeleyvision.org
8 https://uk.mathworks.com
9 https://mxnet.apache.org
10 J. A. Meister et al.
might be miscategorised fand the DL model might not be able to differentiate
between a genuine or malicious behaviour correctly. The reason for this failure
is due to the definition or knowledge base for genuine and malicious behaviour
is in the behaviour set used for training. Re-enforced learning can be used to
accommodate this; however, this can open up a potential avenue for an adversary
to modify the behaviour classification of an ML DL. The second crucial element
is the data’s trustworthiness. As one of the most important elements of DL, data
should be sourced from a trusted environment and this is also true for malicious
activities captured (and tagged) in the training data set. The challenge is to
capture malicious activities in a trusted manner from a real environment or a lab
simulation that accurately depicts how an attacker could behave. Furthermore,
the training is carried out on a data set that represents ‘past’ attacks (known
attack patterns) and potentially will not be representative of ‘future’ attacks
(unknown vulnerability and attack patterns). The challenges related to new and
unknown attacks are further discussed in section 5.
4.2 Adversarial Samples
There is extensive work in academic literature that discusses the impact and
limitation of ML/ DL against adversarial samples [46]. From a deployment point
of view, security and privacy practitioners have to keep in mind that a deployed
DL system might be susceptible to adversarial samples. This means that an
attacker could influence the DL model’s training to learn malicious activities as
genuine. By doing so, attackers are enabled to accomplish their goal without
DL detecting and flagging them. The challenge related to adversarial samples
is crucial as organisations deploying DL based security and privacy mechanism
would prefer for it to evolve over time, thereby accommodating the increasing
sophistication in the threat landscape. However, allowing the evolution of the
DL model after initial training opens it up to adversarial samples. On the other
hand, if a DL technique is restricted to the initial training then it is not flexible
and extensible, two of the important functions DL should have to cope with
the challenges of cybersecurity and privacy. A potential middle ground could be
to select a DL technique that is the least susceptible and designed to withstand
adversarial samples. Unfortunately, even with such methodologies, the likelihood
of adversarial samples cannot be completely removed. Therefore, adversarial
samples are a threat vector that will see more sophistication in the future as
more and more organisations deploy ML/ DL based cybersecurity and privacy-
preservation mechanisms.
4.3 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
Organisations dealing with EU citizens’ data have to comply with GDPR regu-
lations. GDPR gives a number of rights to consumers, among which are the two
that we are going to discuss in this section: Right-to-Know (RtK) and Right-to-
Rectification (RtR).
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Regarding RtK, Article 15.1.h states that “the existence of automated decision-
making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in
those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data sub-
ject” [5]. This article requires a meaningful information about the processing
method used to process their data. As discussed before, DL is chaotic in many
instances and the steps taken to reach a particular decision might have limited
traceability or support for reverse-engineering. As an example, a user is in his
or her rights to request information on why they received a certain result from
an organisation. The organisation then has to explain how the user’s data was
processed by the company’s AI to generate that particular result. GDPR also
holds firms accountable for bias and discrimination in their automated decisions.
The challenge of explaining how DL has reached a specific decision becomes
paramount – an aspect of the DL that has not been extensively investigated.
To what extent DL’s choice can be explained and whether that is an acceptable
and, more importantly, meaningful explanation to the regulatory-authorities and
consumer needs to be further researched.
RtR (Article 16) states that “[t]he data subject shall have the right to obtain
from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal
data concerning him or her” [5]. If a user exercises RtR, they request changes to
their personal data stored in the system. How this change in the data will impact
previous processing and leaning, which were then based on incorrect data, is still
a big question. The challenge is to make DL rectify its input data selectively post
processing in a manner that does not require a complete retraining.
On a side note, depending on how DL is deployed, the Right-to-Forget, or
RtF, (GDPR, Article 17) might have an impact if a sufficient number of con-
sumers/ users request their data to be deleted. At that point, the knowledge
set reflecting the behaviour of an organisation’s consumers/ users will not be
accurate anymore. How this impacts DL’s subsequent decisions is still unclear
and requires further investigation.
As a cyberseucrity and privacy practitioner, a clear view of the needs and
visions for a DL deployment are necessary. There are plenty of unanswered ques-
tions related to DL in terms of research (Section 5), operation, and legislation
(GDPR). It is safe to say that this technology has the potential to be beneficial
by improving security and privacy-preservation. However, the pertinent question
is whether it is ready and mature enough to be deployed extensively as a security
and privacy mechanism. The answer to this is complex and depends on multiple
factors, including:
1. Organisational requirements and the prioritised security objectives.
2. How the organisation envisions using ML/ DL, keeping in mind that ML/
DL are not silver bullets.
3. Understanding the limitations of ML/ DL and complimenting these tech-
niques with traditional security and privacy measures.
4. Accepting that ML/ DL are in the early stage of development and might
go through many improvements in the next few years, therefore deployed
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systems will have to keep up with rapid change (flexibility, extensibility and
scalability).
5 Research Challenges for Deep Learning
In this section, we put forward list of relevant topics and questions for ML/ DL
research from the perspective of a cybersecurity practitioner.
1. Policy change impact analysis: In an enterprise environment, policies change
regularly, and can be related to the security and privacy aspects of the enter-
prise. The impact assessment of such policies on the enterprise environment
is based on human experts’ knowledge. If the enterprise has deployed ML/
DL as a security and privacy measure, policy changes need to be reflected
in the ML/ DL method’s learning and execution. To the authors’ knowl-
edge, there is no evaluation of how dynamic policies will impact currently
deployed ML/ DL implementations. Therefore, predictive impact analysis
of policy changes on DL based security and privacy mechanism would be a
important step forward.
2. Defining a new policy: An organisation’s security and privacy objectives are
specified by policies and rule-sets. In existing DL, these policies and rule-sets
are represented in the labelling of individual records in the training data set.
If the policy changes after the deployment of a DL based system, the available
option is to generate a new training data set based on the new policies and
retraining the DL model. Generating the training data set and retraining
can be considered costs in terms of performance and time. The challenge
is to cut down this cost and make policy changes as similar to traditional
security mechanisms like firewall, access control and IDS, to name a few.
3. Preparing DL to cope with the ‘future’: The cybersecurity and privacy land-
scape is constantly evolving. To cope with this change, DL has to be flexible
and have the ability to learn new patterns even after deployment. Further-
more, prior knowledge already learned by a particular instance of DL is valu-
able, and the ability to transfer it to other instances (for example among
multiple organisations) would vastly improve the readiness of the collective
cybersecurty field. A potential path forward could be to develop DL tech-
niques with lifelong learning as crucial part.
4. Isolated or Collaborative Learning: Isolated learning has its pros and cons.
The positive side is that as an organisation, your own specific behaviour is
profiled. However, this also means that unless you experience a cyber attack,
you will not be able to profile it. With collaborative learning, if a single in-
stance of the collaboration experiences a cyber attack, its profiling can then
be shared with the other instances in the group. This has the potential of
rapidly improving security countermeasures against new and previously un-
known attacks. Collaborative learning introduces some additional challenges,
such as:
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– Knowledge based collaboration: In collaborative learning, should algo-
rithms share their knowledge or simply the raw records of the out-of-
profile observation? It also requires a method for sharing prior knowledge
between multiple DL instances.
– Raw records based collaboration: Sharing raw records seems simple, as
each instance can run its own learning process over it. However, this
could leak security sensitive data and violate privacy requirements. For
raw records based collaboration, efficient and strong anonymisation tech-
niques have to be developed. This anonymisation technique has to pro-
tect privacy and security sensitive data but at the same retain sufficient
features so that it is still useful for training other DL instances.
5. Making deep learning forget: There is a number of situations where it is
preferable to make the DL de-profile some of the records from its knowledge
base. For example, a) the discovery of malicious data in the training data set
that is now required to be re-labelled as malicious, b) removing adversarial
samples from the DL knowledge and c) if a consumer/ user exercises RtR or
right to forget under GDPR. In such situations, DL techniques need to ‘for-
get’ about certain records. How to achieve this seems to be an open question
that will be crucial in a future with increased awareness about privacy in
the general public and adversaries successfully training DL implementations
with adversarial samples.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we briefly explore the potential, practicality, implications and
shortcomings of DL mechanisms in fields such as security and privacy preser-
vation mechanisms. There are numerous proposals in academic literature that
advocate the success of DL as an effective mechanism for cybersecurity. We do
not evaluate their claims in this paper. We view DL as a mature domain and
evaluate how a security practitioner would go about deploying it, what chal-
lenges and issues they would have to overcome and what options are available
to resolve some of these issues. We do consider that DL has come a long way
and can potentially be applied to security and privacy functions with a defined
set of static behaviours. In such situations, DL can efficiently detect any be-
havioural violations with high accuracy. However, it is too early to consider it
an extensively useable security measure in its own right. DL has a long way to
go before it is mature enough to be deployed as a standalone Unified Threat
Management (UTM) environment. In this paper, we have discussed the aspects
of DL an organisation should keep in mind when deploying a DL based solu-
tion. In addition, we have also included a list of features that would be useful
to security practitioners in number of scenarios if they can be provided by the
DL base mechanisms. In conclusion, DL has a lot of promise and with the right
features, it could become an impactful tool in the security and privacy arsenal.
With the increase of sophistication and complexity of future technology in the
current infrastructure, AI-based security and privacy countermeasures (ML/ DL)
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might be the next logical step. For this reason, cybersecurity researchers have to
become active participants in the ML/ DL evolution, rather then just deploying
them to security and privacy problems as off-the-shelf kits.
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